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Abstract. Energy policy in the European Union (EU) faces two major challenges. The first chal-
lenge is posed by EUs commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere in the
context of the international agreement on climate change. The second challenge is to keep ensuring
European security of energy supply, while its dependency on external sources of energy is pro-
jected to increase. In this paper, two long-term alternative climate change policy scenarios for
Europe are examined. In the first scenario, EU reduces carbon dioxide emissions by domestic
measures; in the second scenario EU maximizes cooperation with the countries of the former Soviet
Union (FSU). Impacts on carbon flows between the EU and FSU and on the external energy depen-
dency of the EU are assessed with an applied general equilibrium model, GTAP-E, whose set of
energy commodities is expanded with combustible biomass as a renewable and carbon-neutral
energy commodity. The results show that there is a trade-off between economic efficiency, energy
security and carbon dependency for the EU. The FSU would unambiguously prefer cooperation.
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1.  Introduction
Energy policy in the European Union (EU) faces two major challenges. The first
challenge is posed by EUs commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to
the atmosphere in the context of the international agreement on climate change.
The second challenge is to keep ensuring European security of energy supply, while
its dependency on external sources of energy is projected to increase (IEA 2002).
These challenges to energy policy must be faced in a time when EUs markets of
electricity and natural gas are in the process of being liberalized; when the EU
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is facing a major political challenge because of the upcoming accession of new
Member States; and when the political stability in major energy-producing coun-
tries in the world is fragile and insecure. 
This paper focuses on the interaction between the challenges of climate change
and energy security to EUs energy policy in the longer term. The primary question
is whether synergy is possible between climate change policies and energy security
policies or whether these policies must necessarily conflict with each other. In
particular, the paper examines two options for pan-European cooperation between
Eastern and Western Europe on energy security and climate change policies in
the longer term. In the first option, the EU tries to meet its reduction targets entirely
by internal measures. In this way, the EU attempts to simultaneously reduce its
carbon dioxide emissions and reduce its external energy and carbon dependency
by actively promoting the indigenous production and use of renewable energy,
in particular that of combustible biomass. In the second option, Eastern and Western
Europe cooperate in climate change policies by establishing an international,
unrestricted carbon dioxide emissions trading program between the two regions.
The economic, energy and environmental effects of these two options are assessed
with the help of an applied general equilibrium model of international trade that
is calibrated to the parameters of the problem at stake. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some background
on EU climate change policies (Section 2.1) and energy security policies (Section
2.2). Section 3 discusses the model and the data. Section 4 specifies the policy sce-
narios. Section 5 presents the results of the simulations (Section 5.1), and interprets
the results for the two policy scenarios (Sections 5.2 and 5.3). Section 5.4 intro-
duces the concept of carbon dependency and quantifies the trade-off between
energy and carbon dependency on the one hand and welfare on the other. Section
6 examines the sensitivity of the results to changes in parameter values, while
Section 7 concludes and suggests areas for further research.
2.  EU policies on climate change and energy security 
2.1.  CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
International climate change policies seem to be in a critical stage at the moment.
It is still unclear whether the Kyoto Protocol will be ratified by enough Parties
to come into effect, and which Parties will eventually aim to meet its targets.
Moreover, there is little progress on the formulation of precise and operational
definitions of the instruments of the Kyoto Protocol, including the trading mech-
anisms and sinks. It is extremely difficult at the present time to foresee the future
development of the international climate change regime and its effects on material
and virtual carbon flows among nations. 
Nevertheless, it may be assumed as a working hypothesis, that an interna-
tional climate change regime will unfold over this century. It may also be assumed
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that this regime will cover at least some industrialised countries and countries with
economies in transition. Means will probably be found to engage developing coun-
tries in this regime, in one way or another. The bottom-line is that the external
costs of carbon emissions (and emissions of other greenhouse gases) will be
internalised into the economic process, to a greater or lesser extent. Given the
differences in carbon content among different fuels and other energy carriers,
this will lead to changes in production and consumption and international trade.
For recent assessments of medium-term impacts of climate change policies on
the European Union, see, for example, Böhringer (2002) and Viguier et al. (2003).
For a broader analysis and discussion of legal, political and economic aspects of
international climate change policies, see Ierland et al. (2003).
The European Commission has taken climate-related initiatives since 1991, when
it issued the first Community strategy to limit carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
and improve energy efficiency. These include a proposed directive to promote elec-
tricity from renewable energy, voluntary commitments by car makers to improve
fuel economy and proposals on taxation of energy products. Proposals for policies
and measures initially focused on the energy, transport and industry sectors, but
the scope later broadened to encompass other sectors such as agriculture, forestry
and waste. In a Green Paper on emissions trading the Commission set out its
ideas on an internal EU-wide Greenhouse Gas (GHG) trading system. The
Commission proposed that the EU trading system should initially focus on CO2
emissions and involve only a relatively small number of economic sectors and
sources that contribute significantly to emissions, but that the scheme could be
broadened in future to include other GHGs and sectors. Several Member States
have developed strategies to meet the targets set by the Kyoto agreements. Several
Member states are also developing internal CO2 trading systems as a part of these
strategies (Zapfel and Vainio 2002). 
International climate change policies and the implementation of these policies
in the EU and its Member States can influence carbon flows between the former
Soviet Union (FSU) and the (enlarged) EU. While there is uncertainty on the
form that the international climate change regime will take, it is likely that both
the international community and the EU will continue to develop and implement
policies in this area. 
Russia and other countries of the FSU could also play a role in EU climate
change policies by increasing their supplies of fuels with a low or zero carbon
content (gas, biomass). Whether this is an attractive option for the EU is also depen-
dent upon other considerations such as, for example, energy (security) policies. 
2.2.  ENERGY SECURITY POLICIES
Energy security is a complex and multi-faceted concept. It has been described
as “one of the most overused and misunderstood concepts in the energy debate”
(Helm 2002: 175). What is behind the idea of energy security is that rapid price
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changes of energy goods are usually very costly to modern economies due to
large adjustment costs. Therefore, energy security policies typically aim at a diver-
sification of energy sources (by type and origin) to reduce the risk of sudden
shocks. However, different countries in different times have perceived the main
risks to energy supply fundamentally different, so that in practice all sorts of
policies have been justified in the name of diversity (Helm 2002). At the moment,
EU energy security policy seems to perceive the greatest risks in the (rising)
external dependency of the Community on energy resources (in particular: Middle
East’ oil and Russian gas) (EC 2001a). Forecasts predict that the EU’s depen-
dence on external sources will reach 70 per cent in 2030, and this situation will
not improve by enlargement. Moreover, a number of EU member states, and in
particular the applicant countries, are entirely dependent on a single gas pipeline
that links them to a single supplier country. 
One of the possibilities to reduce this external dependence might be the
stimulation of the production of domestic sources of renewable energy. The objec-
tive of the EU is to double the share of renewable sources of energy in total primary
energy demand from the present six per cent to twelve per cent by the year 2010
(EC 1997). Within this overall objective, an important role is foreseen for biomass.
To stimulate the production of biomass several financial measures (aids, tax deduc-
tions, and financial support) are considered (EC 2001a: 5). Another possibility that
was recently suggested by Huntington and Brown (forthcoming) is that coun-
tries may want to disproportionally reduce the carbon emissions of fuels with
the largest import shares. This would reduce energy dependency and would also
cut costs because of improvements in the terms of trade.1
EU energy policies are of major importance to the carbon flows between the
FSU and the EU. In the first place, economic and technological options in the
energy sector are of major importance for the cost-effective abatement of CO2 emis-
sions. Will Europe’s energy future remain based on fossil fuels (possibly with
technologies that capture and store CO2 emissions due to combustion), or will a
major switch to renewable energy sources take place? In the second place, what
are the synergies and contradictions between climate change policies and energy
security policies? Both climate change policies and energy security policies empha-
size the importance of demand-side options with respect to energy savings. But
climate change policies and energy security policies may contradict in the area
of supply-side options, for example with respect to the production and use of
coal, and with respect to the reliance on imports of cleaner fuels. 
3.  The model and data
3.1.  GTAP-E MODEL
The numerical analysis in this paper employs the GTAP-E model (version 6.1.5),
a member of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) family of models (Hertel
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1997). The GTAP model is a widely used, comparatively static, multisector,
multiregion applied general equilibrium model. Because it is comparatively static
it calculates only distinct equilibrium positions of the economy, and not the path
along which the economy moves from one equilibrium to the other. The model
makes use of a detailed database with a broad coverage of (trade) distortions
and explicit statistics on transport margins. Firms are assumed to use constant-
returns-to-scale technologies, except for the energy supply sectors that have an
upward-sloping supply function. Import demand is modelled through the
Armington assumption of imperfect substitutability between domestic and imported
goods and between imported goods from different regions. The Armington
approach to import substitution is widely used in applied trade models. It treats
goods from different countries as imperfect substitutes (or varieties), thus avoiding
complete specialization of countries or unrealistically large trade responses to price
changes. The model assumes a global bank to mediate between world savings
and investments, and a region-specific set of equations for consumer demand
that allows for different responses to price and income changes across regions.
GTAP-E has the same structure as GTAP, but its production structure includes a
more detailed description of substitution possibilities among different sources of
energy. Burniaux and Truong (2002) give a full description of the model; see
also the Appendix to this paper.
The GTAP-E model is calibrated on the GTAP-5E database. This database
contains information on input-output relationships and bilateral trade flows among
five factors of production, fifty traded commodities and fifty regions for the year
1997, expressed in million USD. In addition to the standard GTAP-5 database,
the GTAP-5E database contains detailed information on the volumes of traded
and used energy commodities (in million tons of oil equivalent) and on emis-
sions of carbon dioxide (in million tons of carbon). 
The GTAP-5E database does not contain information on renewable energy
sources. For the simulations presented in this paper, we have added to the database
information on biomass as a source of renewable energy. The Appendix to this
paper contains a brief description of the sources of biomass information used
and the methodology employed to integrate this information in the GTAP-5E
database, while preserving its consistency.
Biomass is added to the set of non-electric, non-coal energy commodities in
the GTAP-E model. Substitution possibilities among the energy commodities and
among energy commodities and primary factors of production, such as capital,
are determined by substitution elasticities. Because the present application deals
with a long-term problem, the standard GTAP-E energy substitution elasticities
have been doubled, and those that are relevant to the electricity sector have been
quadrupled (Section 6 examines the sensitivity of the results with respect to the
changes in these elasticities). 
For our policy simulations, we have aggregated the GTAP-5E database into four
regions and eight traded commodities (including biomass). The regions are: EU28
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(see below), Former Soviet Union (FSU), Rest of Annex I (RoA1), and the Rest
of the World (RoW). The sectors include six industries that produce energy com-
modities (coal, crude oil, gas, petroleum and coal products, electricity, and
biomass), and two other industries: energy-intensive industries and the large
residual sector of other industries and services. Table I presents an overview of
the aggregated regions and sectors/commodities. 
For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that the EU will continue with
the process of enlargement over the next decades. In our simulations the EU will
expand towards a union of twenty-eight countries in the year 2030. This ‘EU28’
consists of the present fifteen member states of the EU plus the Eastern European
accession countries (less the Baltic States),2 the countries of the European Free
Trade Area (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland), and Turkey.3
3.2.  BASE DATA
Table II presents carbon flows between EU28 and FSU in the base year (1997).
A distinction is made between the primary energy commodities coal, crude oil,
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Table I.  Aggregated regions and sectors/commodities.
Regions Sectors/commodities
EU28 E_U Coal Coal
Former Soviet Union FSU Crude oil Oil
Rest of Annex I RoA1 Gas Gas
Petroleum and coal products P_C
Electricity Electricity
Biomass Biomass
Rest of World RoW Energy-Intensive Industries En_Int_Ind
Other Industries and Services Oth_Ind_Ser
Table II.  Carbon flows associated with international trade in energy commodities between EU28
and FSU. 
From FSU to EU28 From EU28 to FSU
(in Mt C) (in Mt C)
Coal 009.4 05.0
Crude Oil 071.6 00.1
Gas 049.5 00.7
Oil products 039.6 05.6
Fossil Fuels 170.1 11.4
Biomass 000.2 00.0
Total Carbon 170.3 11.4
Source: Own calculations based on GTAP-5E database and International Energy Agency. 
gas, and biomass on the one hand, and refined oil products on the other hand. Table
II shows that the trade balance is highly skewed, with a large net import of EU28.
In terms of carbon, trade in crude oil and gas dominant, while international trade
in biomass is very limited. The carbon flow from FSU to EU28 totals 170 million
tons of carbon (MtC). There is also a much smaller carbon flow from EU28 to
FSU of 11 MtC. In the remainder of this paper, we will not report the (small)
changes in this latter flow. 
3.3.  ENERGY DEPENDENCY
Energy dependency can be expressed in many ways. In principle, there are as many
different types of energy dependency as there are types of (imported) fuels. In
this paper, the external energy dependency is defined as the ratio of net imports
of primary energy resources (coal, gas, oil, and biomass) to total consumption
of these resources in tons of oil equivalent (toe). 
3.4.  THE BASELINE SCENARIO
The baseline scenario that is used in the policy simulations is derived from the
Reference Scenario of the 2002 World Energy Outlook (WEO2002) of the
International Energy Agency (IEA 2002). The Reference Scenario is based on a
set of assumptions on macroeconomic conditions, population growth, energy prices,
government policies and technology over the period 2000–2030. The Reference
Scenario takes into account all relevant government policies and measures that
have been enacted as of mid-2002, and it is assumed that these policies and
measures will not change over the projection period (IEA 2002).
Global economic growth over the period 2000–2030 is assumed to be three
per cent per year on average. Global population growth is projected to slow down
to an average of one per cent per year over the projection period. Most of global
population growth is projected to occur in the urban areas of developing coun-
tries. World energy use is projected to increase steadily over the projection period.
Fossil fuels will remain the primary sources of energy. Among the fossil fuels,
natural gas will grow fastest, but oil will remain the most important energy
source. The share of renewable energy sources will increase, while that of nuclear
power will fall. The supply of oil and gas is increasingly concentrated in the Middle
East and Russia, while additional demand is mainly from OECD and the dynamic
Asian economies. Hence, international trade in energy commodities will expand,
pushing “supply security back to the top of the energy policy agenda” (IEA 2002:
57). 
Economic growth in the “enlarged EU” (EU28)4 is projected to average two
per cent per year, while population growth falls to an average of 0.1 per cent
per year. Primary energy use is also projected to grow, at a rate of 0.8 per cent
per year. The shares electricity and gas in final energy consumption are projected
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES, ENERGY SECURITY AND CARBON DEPENDENCY 227
to grow, while the shares of oil and, particularly, coal will fall. Electricity
generation will increase its use of gas and renewables, while it will make less
use of oil, coal and nuclear. As a result of these trends, the emissions of carbon
dioxide from the combustion of fossil fuels are projected to increase by almost
23 per cent over the period 2000–2030. 
On the production side, the EU supply of fossil fuels is falling. The produc-
tion of coal will fall and oil production in OECD-Europe is projected to fall by
more than 60 per cent. The indigenous supply of gas is projected to fall slightly.
The production of renewables, including biomass, is projected to increase. The
increased demand for energy in OECD-Europe cannot be met from indigenous
supply. Hence, the energy import dependency of OECD-Europe, especially for
oil and gas will increase substantially. The Middle East will emerge as a major
new supplier of gas to Europe, but the FSU will remain its largest single supplier
(IEA 2002: 116). The imports of fossil fuels from FSU measured in carbon grow
at an annual rate of 1.9 per cent, from 170 MtC in 1997 up to 319 MtC in 2030.
However, IEA (2002) notes “the possible introduction of new policies to curb rising
energy imports and CO2 emissions is a critical uncertainty in Europe’s energy
outlook” (IEA 2002: 177). 
Economic growth in the FSU5 is projected to be 3.1 per cent per year over
the period 2000–2030, and therefore substantially exceeds the growth rate of EU28.
Population growth is negative, however, at –0.3 per cent per year. Total primary
energy use is projected to increase by 1.3 per cent per year. The share of coal in
total primary energy use is projected to decline, while the shares of oil and gas
are projected to increase.6 However, the changes in fuel mix are less extreme
than in OECD-Europe. Carbon dioxide emissions are projected to increase by
47 per cent over the period 2000–2030. 
On the supply side, oil and gas production are projected to increase, but these
projections are highly dependent on the assumption of sufficient investments in
development drilling and pipeline construction. If these investments come true,
Russia will increase its exports of oil and natural gas – to Europe, but increas-
ingly also to China and Korea. 
For the baseline scenario of this paper, the WEO2002 projections are comple-
mented with IEA information on the period 1997–2000, to construct projections
for the period 1997–2030. Key assumptions on the baseline scenario for EU28
and FSU are summarized in Table III. 
4.  Policy scenarios
In this paper we investigate the implications of two alternative scenarios for devel-
opment of carbon flows between the EU28 and the FSU to the 2030s. The assumed
policy goal under each of these scenarios is a 30 per cent reduction in green-
house gas emissions by 2030, using 1990 emissions as a baseline (cf. Berkhout
and Smith, this issue). 
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The two scenarios are:
a. Autonomy/independence: a scenario under which carbon flows are limited as
part of a EU-wide energy policy to reduce dependency on extra-EU sources
and to support a climate policy emphasising intra-EU energy sector adjust-
ments and innovation.
b. Trading/interdependence: a scenario under which carbon flows are maximised
as part of a general emphasis on free trade and liberalisation, and as a way
of reducing the costs of carbon reduction.
In order to tentatively explore the consequences of these alternative scenarios
a number of simplifying assumptions have been made. 
(1) The climate change policy goal of –30 per cent applies to carbon dioxide
only. We thus avoid complications by other gases and sinks. 
(2) The policy goal of –30 per cent applies to EU28 only; FSU is assumed to
stabilize its emissions at 1990 levels, and the other regions are assumed not
to have any climate change policy goals at all (but see Sensitivity Analysis
in Section 6). 
(3) The difference between the scenarios described above is completely determined
by the adoption of different sets of policy measures by EU28 and FSU in
the respective scenarios.
(4) The policy measures themselves are stylised, Idealtypisch, and not bedrag-
gled by the imperfections of political and economic reality.
(5) It should be emphasized that while the baseline scenario assumes fairly large
rates of technological progress and learning with respect to energy efficiency
and the generation of renewable energy, the policy scenarios do not assume
that these rates will increase because of the climate change policies. In other
words, no induced technological progress and learning is assumed in the policy
scenarios. This is, of course, a conservative assumption that may overesti-
mate the compliance costs of carbon reduction policies in the future. 
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Table III.  Key variables for baseline scenario 1997–2030 (annual % growth rates).
Variable EU28 FSU
Economic growth –2.1 –3.0
Population growth –0.1 –0.3
Primary energy supply –0.8 –1.3
Production of coal –0.6 –0.6
Production of oil –3.4 –2.0
Production of gas –0.3 –1.6
Production of biomass –2.3 –0.0
CO2 emissions fossil fuels –0.6 –1.2
Carbon (import) flow –1.9 (from FSU) –0.6 (from EU28)
In the Autonomy/independence scenario, EU28 adopts purely domestic measures
to meet its CO2 reduction target. It establishes a domestic emissions trading system,
but permits cannot be exchanged across borders between the two regions. In
order to stimulate intra-EU energy sector adjustments and innovation, and to reduce
dependency on extra-EU sources of energy, EU28 stimulates the indigenous
production of biomass for energy by way of an output subsidy and limits imports
of biomass by means an import tariff.7
The policy measures in the Trading/interdependence scenario consist of the
creation of a tradable emission permits system across the entire pan-European
region. One permit grants the holder of the permit the right to emit one unit of
CO2. The permits are initially bought at an auction and can afterwards be freely
bought and sold on secondary markets. The total number of permits that is put
on the market is equal to the sum of the allowable CO2 emissions of EU28 and
FSU. The market determines by what proportion each region reduces its emis-
sions.8 In this scenario it is further assumed that trade-distorting subsidies on
coal production in EU28 are eliminated.
The key assumptions of the two policy scenarios are summarized in Table IV.
5.  Results
5.1.  CARBON FLOWS AND ENERGY DEPENDENCY
The Autonomy/independence scenario and the Trading/interdependence scenario
represent two extremes in which EU climate policy could develop. As expected,
carbon flows between the FSU and EU28 are affected by the choice of policy
scenario. We make a distinction between tangible flows of carbon, associated
with energy commodities, and intangible flows, associated with the international
transfer of emission allowances. Figure 1 below shows the size of these tangible
and intangible flows from FSU to EU28 in the two scenarios in 2030.9 For com-
parison, Figure 1 also shows the carbon flows of the base year 1997 and the
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Table IV.  EU28 policies and measures in the two policy scenarios.
Policies/measures Autonomy/independence Trading/interdependence
CO2 emissions reduction in  –30% –30%
comparison to 1990
CO2 emissions trading Within EU28 only Within and between EU28
and FSU
Subsidy for indigenous Output subsidy and None
biomass production import tariffs on biomass
Subsidy for EU coal production Maintained Eliminated
flows in 2030 as they would become if the EU would not taken action to reduce
CO2 emissions (the WEO2002 reference scenario). Without CO2 reduction
measures, the carbon flow from FSU to EU28 would increase from 170 Mt C in
1997 (see Table II) to 319 Mt C in 2030, a rise of 88 per cent. Among the fuels,
the largest increase is for gas, followed by oil (crude plus oil products). The carbon
flow associated with the export of coal to Europe decreases. The situation is
radically different in the Autonomy/independence scenario. The carbon flow from
1997 to 2030 only increases by 39 per cent to 237 Mt C. There is also a differ-
ence in the composition of the fuel exports, as oil is now by far the biggest grower.
The export of coal has become so small that it is no longer visible in Figure 1.
In the Trading/interdependence scenario, the carbon flow is quite different again.
The total tangible carbon flow is similar to the WEO2002 reference scenario,
but the composition of fuel exports is quite different with oil now exhibiting the
largest growth (as opposed to gas in WEO2002). In addition, the Trading/inter-
dependence scenario shows a large intangible flow of carbon of 227 MtC in the
form of emission allowances that are transferred from FSU to EU28. 
How do these different scenarios affect the external energy dependency of
EU28? Table V shows the energy dependency ratios for EU28 in the three
scenarios. The first row shows the overall, global, energy dependency ratios of
EU28, the second row shows EU28’s energy dependency ratios vis-à-vis the FSU.
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Figure 1.  Tangible carbon flows from FSU to EU28 in three scenarios.
The changes in trade flows in the Autonomy/independence scenario are induced
by changes in production and consumption of carbon in EU28. In the Trading/
interdependence scenario they are induced by changes in production and con-
sumption in both regions and are therefore more difficult to explain. We start
with the simplest case: the Autonomy/independence scenario. 
5.2.  AUTONOMY/INDEPENDENCE SCENARIO
EU28 reduces its emissions of carbon dioxide to a level that is 30 per cent below
its 1990 emissions level of 1208 MtC. Compared to EU28’s WEO2002 refer-
ence level in 2030 of 1453 MtC, this is a reduction of 41.8 per cent. FSU commits
to stabilize its emissions at 1990 levels, but since the WEO2002 reference level
does not exceed the 1990 level in 2030, no active reduction policy is required
by FSU. It is assumed that EU28 has by 2030 established an emissions trading
system that encompasses all sectors in all EU28 member states. Firms and private
households require allowances for the combustion of fossil fuels. Hence, electricity
producers are required to hold allowances for the fossil fuels they combust, but
their customers are not required to hold allowances for their consumption of
electricity. On the other hand, oil refiners are not required to hold allowances
for the crude oil they transform into oil products, but their customers do need to
hold allowances for the oil products they combust. Allowances for the annual
emission of 846 million tons of carbon10 are sold at annual auctions at an equi-
librium price of 152 per ton of C (= 41.5 per ton of CO2). Revenues of the
auctions are rebated to households in a lump-sum fashion.11
In order to boost the production and consumption of renewable energy, EU28
subsidizes domestic biomass production. In order to avoid ‘leakage’ of this subsidy
to foreign producers, and in order to enhance energy self-sufficiency within
EU28, an import tariff on biomass is established that effectively ‘freezes’ import
of biomass at pre-policy levels. 
The high price for carbon allowances causes dramatic changes in energy pro-
duction, consumption and trade. Total demand for fossil fuels drops, especially
the demand for coal (–90%). Demands for oil and gas fall too. Although carbon
emissions per unit of energy are higher for oil than for gas, the demand for oil
(–12%) falls less than the demand for gas (–50%). This somewhat counter-
intuitive result can largely be explained by the difference in initial taxation of
232 ONNO KUIK
Table V.  Energy dependency ratios of EU28 in three scenarios vis-à-vis World and FSU.
Vis-à-vis WEO2002 Autonomy/independence Trading/interdependence
% % %
World 67.8 65.6 70.3
FSU 12.7 12.2 16.3
gas and oil products in EU28. Oil products are heavily taxed, resulting in consumer
prices that are more than four times as high as market prices. In contrast, consumer
prices of gas are only one-and-a-half times as high as market prices. While the
amount of carbon allowances that is required for the combustion of oil products
exceeds those of gas per energy unit, their impacts on the consumer price of oil
products are less than on the consumer price of gas. In the Autonomy/independence
scenario the consumer price of gas rises by 58 per cent while the consumer price
of oil products rises only by 15 per cent. Hence, all else equal, demand for gas
falls more than the demand for oil products. And this is indeed the result that
was shown above and that also explains the relatively small effect on the carbon
flows in Table V associated with oil and oil products and the relatively larger
negative effect on the carbon flows associated with gas.
The high initial taxes on oil products also cast doubts on the claim of Huntington
and Brown (forthcoming) that a relatively high carbon taxation of imported fuels
might be in the economic interest of countries due to terms of trade advantages.
It is probably no coincidence that fuels with the highest import shares are already
heavily taxed in many countries. High initial taxes make policies aimed at a further
reduction of consumption of these fuels very costly from a welfare point of
view.12
Demand for biomass depends on its rate of output subsidy. With no additional
subsidies, demand for biomass increases by six per cent relative to the WEO2002
reference. Because the demand for fossil fuels declines, the share of biomass in
primary energy supply increases significantly. In electricity generation, the share
of biomass in primary energy supply increases from 2.5 percent in the WEO2002
reference to 22.0 per cent. Subsidizing biomass production increases the share
of biomass in primary energy supply even further. A 100 per cent subsidy, as in
the Autonomy/independence scenario, raises the share of biomass in electricity gen-
eration to 33.9 per cent. 
But what are the benefits of this increased use of biomass? With the emis-
sions trading system in place, total emissions of CO2 are determined by the fixed
quantity of allowances offered for sale. Under these circumstances, increased
use of biomass does not reduce total carbon emissions. Increased use of domes-
tically produced biomass could, however, lessen EU28’s energy dependency.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the amount of biomass subsidy and energy
dependency of EU28. 
Figure 2 shows that energy dependency (Y-axis) is a decreasing function of
the subsidy amount. The rate of decrease becomes smaller as the amount of the
subsidy increases. The four diamonds in Figure 2 show energy dependency at
subsidy rates of 0%, 50%, 100%, and 150% respectively. At these subsidy rates,
energy dependency of EU28 drops from 67.6%, to 66.1%, to 65.6%, and finally
to 65.4%. The X-axis of Figure 2 shows the total expenditure on subsidy. The 100%
subsidy, as in the Autonomy/independence scenario, requires an annual expendi-
ture of around 7 billion.
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The 100% biomass subsidy thus reduces energy dependency by 2 percent-points.
The biomass subsidy does not, however, affect carbon flows significantly. The
reason for this is that the induced substitution effect (away from fossil fuels and
towards biomass) is counterbalanced by an equally important “income” or “output”
effect which allows more energy to be used because the subsidy makes the
price of energy as a whole (the composite energy good) relatively cheaper. The
subsidy enables EU28 to use more energy without violating the binding CO2 con-
straint to which it has committed to by its climate policy. Energy dependency
falls not because less energy is imported, but because more energy is domesti-
cally produced.
5.3.  TRADING/INTERDEPENDENCE SCENARIO
The Trading/interdependence scenario is clearly quite different. In this scenario,
emissions trading is expanded over the entire pan-European region. The rules
for emissions trading are the same as laid out in Section 5.2 for the Autonomy/
independence scenario; the only difference is the wider geographical region of
application. The result is that relatively cheap abatement options in the FSU can
now be exploited by EU28 firms and citizens. Marginal abatement costs (and
the price of CO2 allowances) drop dramatically from 152 to 63 per ton C
(or from 42 to 17 per ton CO2). More than 42 per cent of the emissions reduc-
tion is now carried out in the FSU, financed by the sale of CO2 emissions
allowances to EU28. 
The contribution of the elimination of coal subsidies in EU28 in this scenario
is relatively minor. Without this elimination, the price of CO2 emissions allowances
would have been slightly higher. Nevertheless, the elimination of these perverse
subsidies under the present scenario assumptions generates a welfare gain to EU28
of 21 million.
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Figure 2.  Biomass subsidy and energy dependency.
Figure 1 showed that the tangible carbon flow between FSU and EU28 is
maintained at its WEO2002 reference level in the Trading/interdependence
scenario, and is even slightly above this level. This is perhaps a bit surprising as
total energy demand in EU28 falls by about a quarter. Although EU28 engages
in emissions trading with FSU, it still reduces CO2 emissions at home by 26 per
cent. All else equal we would expect imports of energy resources to fall by about
a quarter too. Table VI shows that overall energy imports of EU28 fall by 18
per cent (first column). Table VI also shows, however, that the change in import
demand vastly differs among regions and that import demand from the FSU slightly
increases. The primary reason for these differences is the carbon reduction measures
that are taken in the FSU in the context of the emissions trading scheme and
that reduce the demand for energy in the FSU by about a quarter too. As a con-
sequence of this reduction in demand, domestic prices for energy commodities
fall in the FSU and exports become relatively more attractive, including exports
to EU28. 
Hence, although overall import demand of energy commodities by EU28 falls
in the Trading/interdependence scenario, the price changes of energy commodi-
ties that result from emission reduction measures in the FSU cause exports from
the FSU to be maintained at their pre-policy levels. The relatively lower import
prices of energy commodities from the FSU also explain the increase in energy
dependency in the Trading/interdependence scenario that was shown in Table V.
The increase in energy dependency to 70.3 per cent can be explained by increased
imports from the FSU. 
The size of the carbon flow between FSU and EU28 is also affected by the finan-
cial transfers that are a consequence of the purchase of emission allowances by
EU28. How does EU28 finance the purchase of these emission allowances? EU28
could draw on its official reserves in its Central Bank, but that would not qualify
as a sustainable policy. The only other way for the EU28 to finance these foreign
allowances is to create a surplus on its current account; that is to create a surplus
in its international trade in goods and services. In order to do so, EU28 has to
depreciate its currency so as to make its exports cheaper on the world market
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Table VI.  Change of import demand of EU28 by fuel and region.
Change in import demand from: 
World (%) FSU (%) RoA1 (%) RoW (%)
Coal –80.9 –79.3 –86.3 –86.7
Oil 0–4.0 –15.6 –13.1 0–9.1
Gas –27.8 –14.1 –42.0 –37.3
Total * –18.3 –00.7 –83.8 –17.7
* Weighted by source at world prices.
and to make its imports more expensive.13 This depreciation limits total imports
of EU28, including the imports of energy commodities from the FSU. Numerical
analysis with GTAP-E showed that this effect indeed occurs in the Trading/
interdependence scenario. Without any balance of payment constraint, the
associated carbon flow from FSU would be 6 per cent higher at 339 Mt C.
However, EU28 would then run a current account deficit of 3.7 billion. In the
Trading/interdependence scenario it is assumed that EU28 finances its purchase
of foreign emission allowances by creating an appropriate surplus on its current
account, thus limiting overall imports and limiting carbon flows to the magni-
tudes depicted in Figure 1.
5.4.  CARBON DEPENDENCY AND WELFARE COSTS
Table V above showed how the different climate change policy options that make
up the two scenarios affect energy dependency of EU28. Without any climate
change policies energy dependency of EU28 would rise from 40 per cent in 1997
to almost 68 per cent in 2030. In the Autonomy/independence scenario, energy
dependency falls to 66 per cent. Figure 2 showed the relationship between the
energy dependency ratio and subsidies on domestic biomass production. In the
Trading/interdependence scenario, the energy dependency ratio rises to more
than 70 per cent. This is not the end of the story, however. In the Trading/
interdependence scenario, the EU28 is also dependent upon the external supply
of carbon credits or allowances. A volume of 227 MtC of emission allowances
is transferred from FSU to EU28. Let us call the external dependency on emission
allowances “carbon (trading) dependency”. Carbon (trading) dependency can be
defined as the ratio of net import of carbon allowances to total consumption of
energy commodities in terms of carbon. We now have two types of external depen-
dency ratios with respect to the consumption of energy: energy dependency and
carbon (trading) dependency. Table VII compares these dependency ratios to the
money metric of the welfare costs of the climate change policy options in both
scenarios and for both regions.14
In the Autonomy/independence scenario energy dependency and carbon depen-
dency of EU28 is around 65 per cent in 2030. Welfare costs for EU28 are almost
95 billion. Table VII also shows that the welfare costs for RoW are negative
in this scenario. Only RoA1, who, by assumption, implement no CO2 reduction
measures, benefits from EU28s policy measures. In the Trading/interdependence
scenario, the carbon dependency of EU28 is 21 per cent. The welfare costs under
this scenario for EU28 are almost half of those under the Autonomy/indepen-
dence scenario. Global welfare costs are only 40 per cent of those under the
Autonomy/independence scenario. Especially FSU benefits from the emissions
trading in the Trading/interdependence scenario. While it suffers an annual welfare
loss of 5.4 billion under the Autonomy/independence scenario, it enjoys a welfare
gain of 12.0 billion under the Trading/interdependence scenario. 
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6.  Sensitivity analysis
It is good practice to assess the sensitivity of the results CGE models with respect
to key assumptions on parameters and design issues. This section assesses the
sensitivity of the main results of the previous section with respect to (i) the
elasticity of substitution among fuels and between energy and capital (energy
substitution); the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign supply
and among alternative foreign supplies (trade substitution); and the sensitivity of
the results with respect to assumptions on emission reductions in other Annex I
regions (RoA1 reductions). 
For the sensitivity analysis use was made of the Systematic Sensitivity Analysis
(SSA) feature of GTAP (Arndt 1996). SSA reports the sensitivity of model
outcomes to parameters and policy shocks in terms of means and standard
deviations (S.d.). 
(1) The carbon flow between the FSU and EU28 is moderately sensitive to
changes in the model’s energy substitution parameters. Assuming a normal
distribution for the carbon flow value, one can be 95% confident that its
value will be between plus or minus two standard deviations of the mean,
i.e. between 232 and 241 MtC in the autonomous scenario (its simulation value
was 237 MtC) and between 315 and 325 MtC in the trading scenario (its
simulation value was 320 MtC). The shadow price of carbon emissions is
also moderately sensitive to changes in energy substitution parameters.
The rate of energy dependency is only slightly affected by changes in these
parameters.
(2) The model’s outcomes are not very sensitive to changes in trade elasticities,
with the exception of the carbon flow in the trading scenario, which is
moderately sensitive to such changes. 
(3) Carbon reduction policies of other Annex I regions increase the shadow price
of CO2 emissions in EU28 and increase energy dependency (as the import
of energy resources (e.g. oil) becomes cheaper), but they reduce the mean
carbon flow between FSU and EU28 (from 236 to 228 MtC). The standard
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Table VII.  Trade-off between energy dependency and climate change policies.
Autonomy/independence Trading/interdependence
Energy-dependency (%) –065.6 –70.3
Carbon trading dependency (%) –000.0 –21.2
Welfare costs ( bn) to
EU28 0–94.6 –49.7
FSU 00–5.4 +12.0
RoA1 00+3.2 0+2.3
RoW 0–11.1 0–8.0
WORLD –107.8 –43.4
deviations show, however, that the model outcomes are fairly robust towards
changes in climate policies in other Annex I regions.
The sensitivity analysis gives some confidence in the “robustness” of the model
outcomes to changes in key parameter values. It also shows that carbon reduc-
tion policies in other Annex I regions do not radically change the results. 
7.  Conclusions
The design of Europe’s future climate change policies has major impacts on a
number of policy variables. Without additional climate change policy measures,
the external energy dependency of the expanded EU, EU28, would rise from
about 40 per cent in 1997 to almost 70 per cent in 2030. FSU remains a major
import source of gas and oil. European climate change policies can affect carbon
flows between EU28 and FSU and Europe’s overall external energy dependency.
If EU28 pursues major reductions of its CO2 emission by domestic measures alone,
the carbon flow from FSU would diminish. A domestic EU system of emissions
trading would have a larger effect on gas imports than on oil imports, because
of its relatively high initial taxation of oil products. EU28 could marginally
reduce its external energy dependency by subsidizing the domestic production
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Table VIII.  Sensitivity analysis on key parameters and policy shocks*.
Autonomous scenario Trading scenario
Carbon flow Energy Price of Carbon flow Energy Price of 
FSU-EU in dependency CO2 /tCO2 FSU-EU in dependency CO2 /tCO2
2030 (MtC) (%) 2030 (MtC) (%)
1.  Sensitivity to assumptions on the elasticity of energy substitution (±50%)
Mean 236.4 65.6 41.8 320.0 70.3 17.2
S.d. 002.3 00.2 03.3 002.6 00.3 00.8
2.  Sensitivity to assumptions on trade elasticities (±50%)
Mean 236.5 65.6 41.4 319.5 70.3 17.1
S.d. 000.8 00.4 00.2 003.0 00.2 00.2
3.  Sensitivity to assumptions on RoA1 reductions (0 to 100% of EU reductions) 
Mean 228.3 66.8 43.4 314.6 71.5 18.0
S.d. 003.2 00.3 01.0 001.3 00.2 00.3
* Sensitivity analysis performed with the method of “Gaussian Quadrature”. Energy substitution
parameters (ELKE, ELCO, ELLY, ELFY) and trade substitution parameters (ESBD, ESBM) range
over ±50% of their simulation values, assuming a triangular distribution around the mean. Carbon
reduction targets in RoA1 range over zero to one hundred percent of actual EU28 reduction
percentages, also assuming a triangular distribution. 
of renewable energy sources, such as combustible biomass. Our simulations
suggest, however, that this may be a costly policy. 
A pan-European system of emission trading, including FSU, would dramatically
reduce CO2 permit prices and the overall welfare costs of climate change policies.
However, EU28s external energy dependency would increase. Next to its depen-
dency on foreign energy, EU28 also becomes (heavily) dependent upon the external
supply of carbon allowances. 
In the final analysis, the preference of FSU for cooperation in climate change
policies seems unambiguous. For EU28, the preference for cooperation seems
undisputable from an economic perspective. However, our analysis suggests that
efficient climate change policies increase energy dependency and, especially,
carbon (trading) dependency. Hence, energy security policy is unlikely to free
ride on climate change policy and this needs to be taken into account in the
formulation of such policies. 
The present analysis was based on a number of simplifying assumptions. One
assumption was that only EU28 and FSU would continue with climate change
policies, while the other world regions would not. It might be potentially inter-
esting to relax this assumption and to examine alternative global CO2 reduction
scenarios. Also in the integration of biomass in the GTAP-E model and database,
a number of simplifying, and perhaps arguable, assumptions were used. In further
work, some of these assumptions, for example on technology, prices, and substi-
tution elasticities, could be examined and refined. Finally, a dynamic representation
of technology development under different policy scenarios could potentially
generate interesting insights. 
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Appendix: Integrating biomass in the GTAP-5E database and model
The primary database of GTAP-5E is expressed in monetary values (in millions
of 1997USD).15 Energy commodities are also expressed in volume units (million tons
of oil equivalent Mtoe). For this application I added data on biomass energy.
Volume data were taken from IEA energy balances. Imports and exports of biomass
energy were balanced in such a way that global imports equal global exports in
the base year. 
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Value data (in millions of 1997USD) were calculated using the assumption that
the price of combustible biomass per ton of oil equivalent (toe) is equal to the price
of coal per toe (about 50 USD per toe depending on region and demanding sector).
It has also been assumed that the input vector for biomass is proportional to the
input vector for agriculture [because of this and the fact that identical substitu-
tion parameters are used, the production technology of biomass energy is identical
to the production technology of agriculture]. Moreover, taxes and tariffs on biomass
are identical to those on agriculture. Consistency of the database was preserved
by subtracting the added biomass values from the original agriculture values
(both for inputs and outputs). Finally, it has been assumed that “electricity” is
the only sector that imports biomass. 
In the GTAP-E model, biomass is included in the set of non-coal, non-electricity
energy commodities. Figure A1 depicts the production structure of GTAP-E with
biomass in a slightly simplified manner. 
The various inputs in production are combined through CES functions, with
substitution parameter 
 
σ. For the energy inputs into production, the values of
the substitution parameters are shown in Table A1.
Model files can be found on URL: http://130.37.129.100/english/o_o/insti-
tuten/IVM/research/ihdp-it/implementation/index.htm.
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Figure A1.  Production structure of GTAP-E with Biomass (simplified).
Notes
01. We are sceptical of this claim, see Section 5.
02. The Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) could not be added to the enlarged EU region
because they are integrated into the FSU region in the GTAP-5E database. Cyprus and Malta
could also not be added to the EU, as they are integrated in RoW in the GTAP-5E database.
These omissions have little effect on the size of the carbon flows. The Baltic States emit less
than two percent of the FSUs carbon dioxide emissions and the Baltic States plus Cyprus and
Malta emit only about one percent of the carbon dioxide emissions of EU28. 
03. The model that was used for the present simulations plus relevant data and parameter files can
be found on URL: http://130.37.129.100/english/o_o/instituten/IVM/research/ihdp-it/implemen-
tation/index.htm. 
04. EU28 is almost identical to the IEA region “OECD-Europe”, except for the EU28 member
states Bulgaria, Romenia and Slovenia who are not part of OECD-Europe. In terms of energy
use and CO2 emissions this difference is insignificant. The WEO2002 projections for OECD-
Europe are therefore used for EU28 projections in this paper. 
05. IEA (2002) presents projections for ‘Transition Economies’ and for ‘Russia’, but not for the FSU.
The region ‘Transition Economies’ includes more countries than those belonging to the FSU,
while ‘Russia’ includes fewer countries. The difference between the forecasts of annual rates
of economic growth between ‘Transition Economies’ and ‘Russia’ is not big: 3.1 per cent for
‘Transition Economies’ against 3.0 per cent for ‘Russia’. For our projections for FSU we make
use of the WEO2002 projections for ‘Transition Economies’. 
06. See Poussenkova (this issue) for an interesting discussion on the economics and politics of the
Russian energy sector. Under discussion in Russia is the option to increase the share of coal in
electricity and heat production and sell more gas abroad. Domestic gas prices in Russia (including
non-payment) are way below world market prices. 
07. EU28 could also subsidize other form of renewable energy production. The limitation to biomass
is due to the limitations of our model. 
08. Note that we assume a perfect market for emission credits, i.e. a market subject to the Law of
One Price. Under which legal regime the credits are traded, be it Joint Implementation, Emissions
Trading or a combination of both, is of no concern to us in the present analysis. 
09. Figure 1 does not show flows of biomass, as they are too small to be detectable. 
10. Allowed emissions are 30 percent lower than 1990 emissions, which is 70% of 1990 emission
(= 846 MtC). 
11. It is well known, of course, that alternative rebate schemes may produce different welfare effects.
We do not pursue this issue here, however. 
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Table A.1.  Substitution parameters in the production function.
Substitution Substitution between: Value in EU28 In other 
parameter regions
In In other 
electricity sectors*
ELKE Composite energy and capital 2.0 1.0 0.5
ELLY Electricity and non-electricity 4.0 2.0 1.0
ELCO Other fuels and coals 4.0 2.0 1.0
ELFU Other fuels (including biomass) 4.0 2.0 1.0
* Except for the energy sectors where the substitution parameter is zero. 
12. Huntington and Brown (forthcoming) do not take these initial taxes into account. Preliminary
calculations with GTAP-E (not reported here) suggest that, for the EU at least, the welfare
effects of differentiating carbon taxes over fuels according to their import shares may be (very)
negative. 
13. For an instructive discussion on emissions trading and capital flows, see McKibbin et al. 1999.
14. The money metric used to assess the welfare costs is the “equivalent variation”, i.e. the sum
of money that would leave people indifferent between their initial situation and their situation
after the policy change. 
15. Exchange rate used between Euro and USD is: 1.13 $/ (average exchange rate for 1997).
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